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MacArthur before firing him on 11
April 1951. Could the White House
come up with a line to rival the general’s riveting message: “There is no
substitute for victory”? Perhaps, but it
could not deliver one, since its credibility was largely shot by mid-1951, when
Truman registered 23 percent public
approval, the lowest in the history of
the Gallup Poll. In a battle of sound
bites, General Omar Bradley, chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had to rescue administration policy by testifying
that MacArthur’s proposal to attack
China “was the wrong war, at the
wrong place, against the wrong enemy.”
One hears that Casey’s next book will
be about the U.S. Army and correspondents in World Wars I and II. This
reader would have preferred that he
pushed on into the next war—doing
presidents, policy, the media, and public opinion during Vietnam. For those
of us particularly interested in those
topics, Casey would thus produce a trilogy on wartime policy worthy of the
three volumes on military operations
produced by Douglas Southall Freeman
(Lee’s Lieutenants, on the U.S. Civil
War) and Rick Atkinson (The Liberation Trilogy on the U.S. Army in the European theater in World War II). Yes,
Steven Casey is that good.
MICHAEL PEARLMAN

Lawrence, Kansas

Hendrix, Henry J. Theodore Roosevelt’s Naval Diplomacy: The U.S. Navy and the Birth of the American Century. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 2009. 288pp. $34.95

Commander Henry J. Hendrix has written a neat monograph based on his
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doctoral work. He makes two related
arguments: first, that one cannot understand the diplomatic style of President Theodore Roosevelt without first
understanding his attitude toward the
efficacy and use of naval power; and
second, that the existing literature has
not adequately integrated naval and
military historical methods of analysis
with existing diplomatic historical approaches. Consequently, previous interpretations of Roosevelt’s foreign policy
decisions, as they relate to incidents
that involved the use of naval power,
are incomplete, precisely because they
do not fuse the diplomatic and political
with the naval—especially the perspective reflected by the navalist attitudes of
Theodore Roosevelt.
As for structure, the book begins with
the now-common device of the narrative vignette—in this case the “sailing of
the Great White Fleet,” as a means of
establishing the ambience of the moment of the great president and his
great fleet. With the reader now interested in “the rest of the story,” Hendrix
proceeds in a workmanlike and professional manner, establishing in the first
chapter the basis for the beginning of
the “beautiful relationship” between TR
and the object of his affection and desire, the U.S. Navy. Included here is the
story of Roosevelt’s famous action as
Assistant Secretary of the Navy regarding the deployment of Admiral George
Dewey’s Far East Squadron to Manila
Bay. This episode may be regarded as
typical of Roosevelt’s activist attitudes
and actions regarding the Navy.
The remaining chapters focus topically.
The closing chapter on the Great White
Fleet is the only one that deals directly
with the linkage of the U.S. Navy to an
“American Century.” The odd man out
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is the chapter on technology, although
it is a welcome discussion, given both
TR’s fascination with new technology
and the inherently high-tech nature of
navies in general. Additionally, this
chapter provides ammunition for a
much larger argument about modern
Americans and their fascination with
technology.
However, the bulk of the book deals
with the diplomatic-naval arguments
mentioned. Hendrix makes an excellent
case for his thesis that previous historians have paid too little attention to the
intersection of naval and diplomatic
trends of analysis. He employs a
multidisciplinary approach that examines naval signals, logbooks, war plans,
and other archival Department of the
Navy records to render less opaque
some of TR’s diplomatic actions and
motivations.
Although this work is not a biography,
it adds value to existing ones, especially
Edmund Morris’s Theodore Rex, which
focuses exclusively on his presidency.
Theodore Roosevelt had many different
personae, and it has not escaped historians that he was not only a historian
but also a naval historian, par excellence. Neither has it escaped them that,
along with A. T. Mahan and Stephen
Luce, he is the father of the modern
U.S. Navy. However, Hendrix makes a
strong argument that TR’s naval persona was critical to understanding his
use of power, especially in foreign
relations.
The book’s minor weakness is its narrow, monographic scope. The chapters
proceed in a generally chronological
manner but maintain no extended narrative thread—the unifier, instead, is
the topical theme. Hendrix may have
missed an opportunity to make a larger

statement about the relationship of the
man to the institution and its importance to the United States under the entire Roosevelt “dynasty.” There is much
peripheral evidence here about the institutional and organizational aspects of
the Navy that made this reviewer long
for more discussion. TR’s presidency
was a time of profound change in the
military establishment of the United
States, a period that involved the Root
reforms of the Army and the establishment of the General Board of the Navy,
as a sort of proto–naval general staff.
TR’s role in these critical early years of
the General Board would have been
worth exploring.
These are minor quibbles in an otherwise fine book that adds substantially to
the understanding of an important aspect of the rise of the United States to
great-power status and influence during
Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency. I recommend this book for a broad audience, especially those interested in the
development and execution of American foreign policy in the early twentieth
century.
JOHN T. KUEHN

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Brooks, Max. World War Z: An Oral History of
the Zombie War. New York: Crown, 2006. 352pp.
$14.95

“A breath of fresh air stormed into the
Naval War College over the rotting
flesh of the undead,” reads the first
book-club selection of the President
of the Naval War College. Without vilifying another country or radicalizing
any group, World War Z’s zombie
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